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PGM data · Ukraine War
Note: Sources for data of respective presented at the end of this chapter.
Table 1: Russian stockpiles of guided munitions
|
Type |
Stockpile date |
Amount |
As claimed by |
Comment |
|
9M723 “ Iskandr” |
02/24/2022 |
900 |
||
|
05/06/2022 |
200 |
|||
|
9M723 “ Iskandr” (ballistic) |
02/23/2022 |
800 |
As claimed on 06.01.23. First time that the MoD diffentiates between Iskandr ballistic and cruise missile variant counts. |
|
|
9M723 “ Iskandr” (ballistic) |
01/03/2023 |
92 |
||
|
9M278/9M729 “ Iskandr” (cruise) |
02/23/2022 |
100 |
As claimed on 06.01.23. First time that the MoD diffentiates between Iskandr ballistic and cruise missile variant counts. |
|
|
9M278/9M729 “ Iskandr” (cruise) |
01/03/2023 |
52 |
||
|
“Iskandr” [any] |
02/24/2022 |
900 |
||
|
10/14/2022 |
124 |
|||
|
11/18/2022 |
119 |
|||
|
9M723 “Iskand r-M” |
02/24/2022 |
608 |
Extrapolated on claim of 152 available launchers, assuming a minimum of 2 salvos of 2 missiles per launcher. |
|
|
3M-54 “ Kalibr” |
02/24/2022 |
500 |
||
|
05/06/2022 |
350 |
|||
|
“Kalibr” [any] |
02/24/2022 |
500 |
(12.10.22: Reznikov’s i nfographic mentions “sea-launched”) |
|
|
10/12/2022 |
272 |
|||
|
11/18/2022 |
229 |
|||
|
01/03/2023 |
59 |
|||
|
“Kalibr” [any] |
01/04/2023 |
60 |
Mentioning “ sea-based” |
|
|
3M14 “Kalibr” |
04/10/2022 |
540 |
Extrapolated on claims of monthly production of Russian MoD and presumed date of first delivery to army. Claimed results inconsistent with claimed rates and time spans mentioned. |
|
|
9M728 “Kalibr” |
04/10/2022 |
450 |
||
|
S-300 |
02/23/2022 |
8,000 |
||
|
11/18/2022 |
6,980 |
|||
|
01/03/2023 |
6,672 |
|||
|
Kh-101 |
04/10/2022 |
150-200 |
||
|
Kh-101 and Kh-555 (and Kh-55SM) |
02/24/2022 |
444 |
(Claim from 06.01.23 additionally includes the older Kh-55SM variant) |
|
|
10/14/2022 |
213 |
|||
|
01/03/2023 |
118 |
|||
|
Kh-101 |
02/23/2022 |
144 |
||
|
11/18/2022 |
132 |
|||
|
Kh-55 5 |
02/23/2022 |
300 |
||
|
11/18/2022 |
150 |
|||
|
Kh-555 |
04/10/2022 |
600 |
||
|
Kh-101, Kh-555 and “Kalibr” |
01/04/2023 |
160-240 |
||
|
Kh-101, Kh-555 and “Kalibr” |
02/27/2023 |
100 |
||
|
Kh-22 and Kh-32 |
02/23/2022 |
370 |
Seems estimate of usage (250) from 18.11.22 was too high and got corrected on 03.01.23 (to 208) . Thus, remaining stockpile estimate was adjusted upwards. |
|
|
11/18/2022 |
120 |
|||
|
01/03/2023 |
162 |
|||
|
Kh-22 and Kh-32 |
02/27/2023 |
150 |
||
|
Kh-22 |
01/04/2023 |
160 |
||
|
Kh-35 (and Kh-29, Kh-31, Kh-58, Kh-59 ) |
02/23/2022 |
500 |
MoD added Kh-29, Kh-31, Kh-58 and Kh-59 to tally only on 03.01.23. |
|
|
11/18/2022 |
356 |
|||
|
01/03/2023 |
312 |
|||
|
Kh-47M2 “Kinzhal” |
04/10/2022 |
24-48 |
Estimates “several dozens” |
|
|
Kh-47M2 “Kinzhal” |
02/23/2022 |
43 |
MoD corrected usage from 16 down to 10 on 03.01.23 and noted production ramp-up. |
|
|
11/18/2022 |
43 |
|||
|
01/03/2023 |
53 |
|||
|
3M-55 “Oniks” |
02/23/2022 |
470 |
||
|
11/18/2022 |
347 |
|||
|
01/03/2023 |
326 |
Note: “Stockpile date” refers to the date that the claimed amount of stockpiles is referencing. The claim may have been made on a later date.
Table 2: Russian production capabilities for guided munitions
|
Type |
Date of claim |
Amount/ month |
As claimed by |
Comment |
|
“Iskandr” [any] |
11/18/2022 |
6.1 |
48 produced in 237 days from 23.02.22-18.11.22 |
|
|
9M723 “ Iskandr” (ballistic) |
01/03/2023 |
3.5 |
36 produced in 313 days from 2 4 .02.22- 03.01.23 |
|
|
9K720 “Iskandr-M” |
01/27/2019 |
4.2 |
Claimed production rate of 50 per year by Russian defense publication as of 27.01.19. |
|
|
9M278/9M729 “ Iskandr” (cruise) |
01/03/2023 |
1.9 |
20 produced in 313 days from 2 4 .02.22- 03.01.23 |
|
|
3M-55 “Oniks” |
11/18/2022 |
none |
||
|
3M-55 “Oniks” |
01/31/2020 |
4.6 |
Delivery of 55 Oniks missiles to Russian Navy reported in 2019 |
|
|
S-300 |
11/18/2022 |
none |
||
|
3M14 and 9M728 “ Kalibr” |
04/01/2019 |
12 |
Based on claim by Russian MoD of production of 48 missiles per 4 months in April 2019 |
|
|
“Kalibr” [any] |
11/18/2022 |
15. 4 |
120 produced in 237 days from 23.02.22-18.11.22 |
|
|
01/03/2023 |
14.6 |
150 produced in 313 days from 2 4 .02.22- 03.01.23 |
||
|
“Kalibr” [any] |
01/04/2023 |
15-20 |
Mentions production of “sea-based” Kalibr missiles a t about 15-20/month |
|
|
Kh-101 |
11/18/2022 |
none |
||
|
Kh-101, Kh-555/Kh-55SM |
01/03/2023 |
28.2 |
290 produced in 313 days from 2 4 .02.22- 03.01.23 |
|
|
Kh-101 |
01/04/2023 |
30 |
Mentions 30/month |
|
|
Kh-101 |
12/12/2022 |
12.5 |
120 produced in 291 days from 24.02.22-12.12.22 |
|
|
Kh-101 |
12/16/2022 |
7.2 |
Analy zed data from 01.04.18 until 23.11.22 with 402 units in 1,698 days |
|
|
3 0.06.2022 |
6.9 |
350 produced in 1551 days from 01.04.18-3 0 .0 6 .22. |
||
|
12/23/2022 |
10.9 |
52 produced in 145 days from 01.07.22-23.11.22. |
||
|
“ Kalibr” and Kh-101 |
02/27/2023 |
30-40 |
||
|
Kh-555 |
11/18/2022 |
none |
||
|
Kh-22 and Kh-32 |
11/18/2022 |
none |
||
|
Kh-47M2 “Kinzhal” |
11/18/2022 |
2.1 |
16 produced in 237 days from 23.02.22-18.11.22 |
|
|
01/03/2023 |
1.9 |
20 produced in 313 days from 2 4 .02.22- 03.01.23 |
||
|
Kh-35 |
11/18/2022 |
46.2 |
360 produced in 237 days from 23.02.22-18.11.22 |
|
|
Kh-35 (and Kh-29, Kh-31, Kh-58, Kh-59 ) |
01/03/2023 |
43.7 |
450 produced in 313 days from 2 4 .02.22- 03.01.23 |
|
|
Kh-32 |
06/16/2022 |
1.7 |
Estimated yearly production capacity “no more than 20 units”. |
|
|
“ Kalibr”, Kh-101, 9M729 “Iskandr” and Kh-59 |
06/16/2022 |
8.3 |
Luzin estimates total production capability at “about 100 units or even less” based on constraints of engine supply. |
Table 3: Russian usage of guided munitions, starting February 24, 2022
|
Type |
Date (as of) |
Amount |
As claimed by |
Comment |
|
“ Iskandr” [any] |
04.06.2022 |
540 |
||
|
“Iskandr” [any] |
11/18/2022 |
829 |
||
|
9M723 “ Iskandr” (ballistic) |
01/03/2023 |
744 |
As claimed on 06.01.23. First time that the MoD diffentiates between Iskandr ballistic and cruise missile variant counts. |
|
|
9M278/9M729 “ Iskandr” (cruise) |
01/03/2023 |
52 |
||
|
“Kalibr” [any] |
04.06.2022 |
560 |
||
|
“Kalibr” [any] |
11/18/2022 |
391 |
||
|
01/03/2023 |
591 |
|||
|
Kh-101 |
11/18/2022 |
132 |
||
|
Kh-555 |
11/18/2022 |
150 |
||
|
Kh-555 and Kh-101 |
04.06.2022 |
300 |
||
|
Kh-101 and Kh-55/Kh-55SM |
03.01.2023 |
616 |
||
|
“Tochka-U” |
04.06.2022 |
50 |
||
|
3M-55 “Oniks” |
11/18/2022 |
123 |
||
|
01/03/2023 |
144 |
|||
|
S-300 |
11/18/2022 |
1020 |
||
|
01/03/2023 |
1328 |
|||
|
Kh-22 and Kh-32 |
11/18/2022 |
250 |
Corrected downwards on 03.01.23 |
|
|
01/03/2023 |
208 |
|||
|
Kh-35 |
11/18/2022 |
504 |
||
|
Kh-35 (and Kh-29, Kh-31, Kh-58, Kh-59 ) |
01/03/2023 |
638 |
||
|
Kh-47M2 “Kinzhal” |
11/18/2022 |
16 |
Corrected downwards on 03.01.23 |
|
|
01/03/2023 |
10 |
Table sources
1 “How Many ‘Iskander’ and ‘Calibr’ Cruise Missiles Has Russia Left (Quantitative Research),” Defense Express, May 6, 2022, https://en.defence-ua.com/weapon_and_tech/how_many_iskander_and_calibr_cruise_missiles_has_russia_left_quantitative_research-2825.html.
2 “Ukrainian Defense Minister Claims Russia Has Used up Two Thirds of Its Missile Arsenal,” Meduza, accessed February 13, 2023, https://meduza.io/en/news/2022/10/14/ukrainian-defense-minister-claims-russia-has-used-up-two-thirds-of-its-missile-arsenal.
3 Oleksii Reznikov, “Ukrainian Defence Minister Reznikov: Russian High-Precision Missile Arsenal, 2022-11-22,” Tweet, Twitter , November 22, 2022, https://twitter.com/oleksiireznikov/status/1594998365170896896.
4 Oleksii Reznikov, “Ukrainian Defence Minister Reznikov: Russian High-Precision Missile Arsenal, 2022-10-14,” Tweet, Twitter , October 14, 2022, https://twitter.com/oleksiireznikov/status/1580842881853845504.
5 Oleksii Reznikov, “Ukrainian Defence Minister Reznikov: Russian High-Precision Missile Arsenal, 2023-01-03,” Tweet, Twitter , January 6, 2023, https://twitter.com/oleksiireznikov/status/1611449870040109058.
6 Stanislav Mankov, “Російські ракети у війні проти України. Що воно таке, чим небезпечні та коли кінчаться? (Russian missiles in the war against Ukraine. What is it, how dangerous are they and when do they end?),” April 10, 2022, https://site.ua/themightystanislav/rosiiski-raketi-u-viini-proti-ukrayini-shho-vono-take-cim-nebezpecni-ta-koli-kincatsya-i0p42pr.
7 Ulyana Bezpalko, “Вадим Скібіцький, ГУР: Росія уже пройшла стратегічний резерв з усіх видів ракет (Vadym Skibitskyi, GUR: Russia has already passed the strategic reserve of all types of missiles),” РБК-Украина, January 4, 2023, https://www.rbc.ua/rus/news/vadim-skibitskiy-gur-rosiya-proyshla-strategichniy-1672783465.html.
8 Ulyana Bezpalko, “Чи змінить Росія тактику обстрілів і що їй заважає застосувати ‘сирійський сценарій’ (Will Russia change its shelling tactics and what prevents it from applying the ‘Syrian scenario’),” РБК-Украина, February 27, 2023, https://www.rbc.ua/rus/news/chi-zminit-rosiya-taktiku-obstriliv-i-shcho-1677438843.html.
9 Stanislav Mankov, “Російські ракети у війні проти України. Що воно таке, чим небезпечні та коли кінчаться? (Russian missiles in the war against Ukraine. What is it, how dangerous are they and when do they end?).”
10 Oleksii Reznikov, “Ukrainian Defence Minister Reznikov: Russian High-Precision Missile Arsenal, 2022-11-22.”
11 Уляна Безпалько, “Вадим Скібіцький, ГУР: Росія уже пройшла стратегічний резерв з усіх видів ракет (Vadym Skibitskyi, GUR: Russia has already passed the strategic reserve of all types of missiles),” РБК-Украина, January 4, 2023, https://www.rbc.ua/rus/news/vadim-skibitskiy-gur-rosiya-proyshla-strategichniy-1672783465.html.
12 Marc Santora, “Russia Is Using Old Ukrainian Missiles Against Ukraine, General Says,” The New York Times, December 12, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/12/world/europe/russia-ukraine-missiles.html.
13 Александр Пешков, “ВМФ России получил 55 ракет «Оникс» в 2019 году (The Russian Navy received 55 Onyx missiles in 2019),” Телеканал «Звезда», January 31, 2020, https://tvzvezda.ru/news/2020131117-hmTWk.html.
14 “9К720 Искандер-М (Iskandr-M),” НОЗС (“New Defence Order. Strategy”) (blog), January 27, 2019, https://dfnc.ru/katalog-vooruzhenij/army/nazemnye-raketnye-kompleksy/9k720-iskander-m/.
15 Pavel Luzin, “One-Way Ticket – Riddle Russia,” Riddle Russia, July 4, 2022, https://ridl.io/one-way-ticket/.
16 Pavel Luzin, “Russian Challenges in Missile Resupply,” Jamestown, June 16, 2022, https://jamestown.org/program/russian-challenges-in-missile-resupply/.
17 John Hardie, “Estimating Russia’s Kh-101 Production Capacity | FDD’s Long War Journal,” December 16, 2022, https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2022/12/estimating-russias-kh-101-production-capacity.php.
18 Ulyana Bezpalko, “Чи змінить Росія тактику обстрілів і що їй заважає застосувати ‘сирійський сценарій’ (Will Russia change its shelling tactics and what prevents it from applying the ‘Syrian scenario’),” РБК-Украина, February 27, 2023, https://www.rbc.ua/rus/news/chi-zminit-rosiya-taktiku-obstriliv-i-shcho-1677438843.html.
19 Stanislav Mankov, “Російські ракети у війні проти України. Що воно таке, чим небезпечні та коли кінчаться? (Russian missiles in the war against Ukraine. What is it, how dangerous are they and when do they end?).”
20 Oleksii Reznikov, “Ukrainian Defence Minister Reznikov: Russian High-Precision Missile Arsenal, 2022-11-22.”