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Ukraine War – Preliminary PGM Sources


After leaving several drafts sitting on my hard drive for months, I’ve decided to publish them, unfinished as they may be. This post is one such draft.


Research interest: Tracking and mapping missile and artillery strikes utilizing precision guided munitions (PGM).

Statistics and dashboards

Raw data



Ukrainian government-affiliated sources

Regional military administration (ODA) Telegram channels:

State Emergency Services of Ukraine (SESU) / DSNS:

Armed Forces - ZSU t.me/operativnoZSU

Regional prosecutors (Prokuratura)

Russian government-affiliated sources

Ministry of Defence

Ukraine War – Ideas for analysing strikes


Searching twitter.com, from 22th of February until 31st of August: since:2022-02-22 until:2022-08-31


  • Trawling ukrainian_videos channel, which in turn aggregates data from multiple war-focussed sources (already includes automated translations via Google Translate).
  • Aggregating data from ODA and DSNS channels (see previous post).

Ukraine War – Hubris

A story in three acts, not necessarily based on real events.

Act one

Force X maneuvers their navy fairly close to shores of Force Y, ostentatiously threatening amphibious landing. Force Y seemingly compelled to keep a contingent of its manpower pinned to avert landing. Waters around Force Y shores heavily mined, with some mines coming loose and drifting due to unfavourable weather.

Act two

Force Y in possession of unmanned aerial systems with capable EW component. Decides to “risk” one of said systems by flying it close to minor Force X ship in what Force X assesses to be a major blunder.

Force X naval air defense/CIWS engages target. Target successfully repelled and maybe even destroyed. Seemingly huge blow to Force Y, who is only said to field around 40 units of said type.

Force X sees opportunity to convert engagement into internet clout, MoD triumphantly releases footage revealing response procedure and timings.

Time passes.

Act three

Heavy seas. Force X, aware of Force Y fielding anti-ship cruise missiles, nevertheless maneuvers pride of their regional fleet named for capital city within striking distance.

Force Y sorties unmanned aerial asset near capital ship, drawing attention from ship’s air defense systems, paints target for ASCM closing in on ship at wavetop height. Force X AD distracted. Hit on target, ammunition stores ignite.

Force X claims spontaneous combustion aboard ship, claims no enemy action, claims crew successfully evacuated, claims fires put out, claims ship returning to port under own power.

Short time passes.

Force X forced to admit their capital ship has joined the submarine forces.


Force X - which had previously denied passage to Force Y naval assets through regional strait - unable to replenish naval assets in regional body of water due to third party blocking access to oceans, invoking archaic treaty from the time of the predecessor to the predecessor of Force X.

(Note: Maybe it was just a mine hit. Time will tell…)

Ukraine War – Preliminary military observations


After leaving several drafts sitting on my hard drive for months, I’ve decided to publish them, unfinished as they may be. This post is one such draft.

This post serves as a snapshot in time of my observations and biases. It is not meant as endorsement of any particular action or policy.

Wrong assumptions

I would have expected these parts of infrastructure to collapse immediately: - Internet access seriously disturbed and degraded - Military net: - Ground lines of comms, satellite comms jammed or sabotaged - Networks thoroughly infiltrated - Civilian 3G/4G towers sabotaged and taken down - Air defense network wiped out - Rail network and road-based logistics attacked at dispatch centers - Black-sea based shipping taken out by destroying loading/unloading areas of ports, cyber attacks on dispatch and command - All hard drives wiped

NotPetya was incredibly stupid in hindsight, underlining the need for hardened networks not only for military, but also preparing civilian sectors.

I would not have expected COIN (for police/special forces) and insurgency training by foreign advisors to pay off, but it seems to have created force multipliers. Military advisers seem to be doing net positive instead of teaching wrong doctrine.

Purge of Russian-aligned personnel in military and security agencies seems to have left less of a knowledge gap than expected and in fact has allowed competent junior officers to rise, bringing new tactics and tech with them.

Weird how so many different countries supplying widely different arms, military aid and intelligence has actually resulted in well-planned deployment of Ukrainian forces.

Ukraine War – Beginning

Another year has passed by without me taking the time to reflect and write down my current thoughts on matters that move me. I’ve noticed I’m happy to discuss them with my family, friends and acquaintances, but did not care to discipline myself enough to formulate those thoughts into writing that I could refer to and look back upon at some point in the future.

Those topics concern European unity, values and integrity, as well as security matters in the context of the conflict in eastern Europe now ongoing for more than eight years, threatening to spill over into the wider European sphere.

This series will focus on the sources I think are valuable, my analysis, and how my thinking has already changed back-and-forth multiple times.


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